in the sense of parties and parliaments, but politics none the less. Much academic literature shares this view of social movements as "politics by other means", from resource mobilisation and political opportunity structure approaches to analyses of social movements as expressions of economic interests (for an overview, see Diani 1992a). It is interesting, then, that precisely in continental Europe, where contemporary social movements have arguably made the greatest impact on the party system and engaged in the sharpest confrontations with the state, theorists have tended more and more to stress the cultural aspects of social movements.
One theme sees movements as rooted in specific sociocultural milieux: largescale, ñlifestyleî responses to structured experience of inequality, with differing issues and priorities (Vester et al. 1993 , Hradil 1987 ; and local ñmovement milieuxî within these, and the shifts in class habiti that can be identified between generations here (MÙller 1990) . Another approach identifies a shared culture as a structural element of social movement activity: as an identity enabling the networks between organisations, groups and individuals that make up a movement (Diani 1992a (Diani , 1992b ; or as ñcognitive praxisî combining worldview, issue-specific knowledge and modes of organisation (Eyerman and Jamison 1991) . Thirdly, social movements can be analysed as cultural challenges: movements may struggle to control the cultural definition of ñhistoricityî, societal self-production (Touraine 1981 (Touraine , 1 1985 ; their structural form may itself be a symbolic message to the wider society (Melucci 1985 (Melucci , 1989 (Melucci , 1992 ; or there may be a division between ñpoliticalî and ñculturalî movement strategies (Raschke 1985) .
The "social movements" problematic could then be restated with an emphasis on the culture of movement milieux as the source of mobilisation, of the internal culture of movement activity, and of wider challenges to the social order. The need is then to locate particular forms of engagement with power and the political within particular sociocultural formations. One possible response is the critical theory analysis of movements as defending the communicative rationality of the lifeworld against colonisation by capitalist and state rationalities (Habermas 1984 (Habermas , 1987 ). Yet while particular, "decommodified" lifeworlds are identified as crucial (Offe 1985) , it is a long way from a universal communicative rationality to the specific cultural logics of contemporary lifeworlds. If instrumental rationalisation had specific roots in Calvinist soteriology, so communicative rationalisation must have particular beginnings.
A partial remedy is Eder's (1985 Eder's ( , 1993 analysis of contemporary movements as expressing the habitus of the petite bourgeoisie and its struggle to impose its cultural definitions; yet this habitus is ascribed rather than examined, read off from the structural position of the class -and unsurprisingly contradicted by the Hannover project's findings of significant transformations in class habitus within movement milieux (MÙller 1990 , Vester et al. 1993 .
Both critical theory and Eder's approach offer to relate movement activities to movement milieux, but both fail to take account of the cultural specificity of the latter. The issue is then how to theorise, and research, such specificity.
The concept of local rationalities
2 What is needed is a heuristic concept that does not already assume a specific cultural content. Such a concept would have to make it possible to link the culture of movement milieux with the forms of activity and challenges raised by social movements; avoid an a priori exclusion of the political or the cultural; and enable an empirical engagement with the cultural specificities of actual movement milieux. I want to suggest the concept of "local rationalities" as a means of doing this.
The specific cultures of movement milieux are ñlocalî, contingent in relation to an abstract theory of modernity yet not necessarily in relation to actual societies. To stress contingency is to avoid the purely rationalist imputation of a particular culture to such milieux on the basis of abstract considerations, and to encourage the realist attempt to relate theory to the phenomenal world (McLennan 1981) or, less grandly, to keep the question open.
"Rationality" then indicates the ontological level on which this culture is being sought. By analogy with the typologies of rationality developed by Weber (1984) and Habermas (1984) , it implies a formal characteristic about the way we make sense of and engage with the world which is capable of being generalised and taking on a life of its own. Thus the formal principle of a rational calculation of which means are best suited to achieve given ends enables that particular rethinking of the world we call modernity. Starting from a specific problem in a specific cultural milieu, it could be generalised to encompass all aspects of action and be used to restructure any other milieu. Thus I am looking, within specific movement milieux, for formal elements in the way people act, talk and make sense of the world which can be generalised to restructure many areas of activity, notably linking everyday life with movement action.
Elements of local rationalities

3
The discussion which follows is drawn from research in progress in Dublin "movement milieux". I am researching in particular a network formed inter alia in London squats, Dublin crashpads, a student occupation and antinuclear and ecological organisations, which has in turn formed a context for a variety of alternative "political" and "cultural" projects and experiments, such as:
 Political projects, such as anarchist and green groups, street theatre, student politics, direct action, etc.; class backgrounds range from skilled working class to professional, and occupations at the time of interview included unskilled worker, residential care worker, research student and computer programmer.
The "local rationalities" of this network, as they appear above all in interview material, stress specific forms of autonomy and reflexivity: autonomy as selfdevelopment and what could be called "lifeworld reflexivity" as the 4 suspension of the "taken-for-granted" attitude, and the willingness to make changes, in all areas of activity.
Autonomy as self-development
The principle of autonomy is of course not a new one within modernity (Wagner 1994 ). Yet most modern formulations take the self for granted. Thus instrumental rationality treats both the self and its goal as assumptions,
and enquires merely what the most effective way of getting from A to B is.
Even in its most hedonistic forms, possessive individualism is simply a special case of this approach. Romanticism, commonly ascribed to movement milieux, assumes that there is a natural, pre-given -and already known -self, albeit obscured by conventions and civilisation, and that the issue is one of placing this natural self first. The main theme is that of moving away from instrumental approaches, for example, that of seeking the best available employment, towards an explorative approach to one's own life. This explorative sense is underlined by the relatively weak articulation of the nature of the alternatives and how to get there: it is not simply choosing an alternative strategy to achieve preexisting goals. Rather, goals are something to be revised along the way.
Similarly, instead of identifying with a fixed self (whether the given self of instrumentalism or the "true" self of romanticism), the self is seen as something to develop. One takes a distance from "the self" in order to change it or observe it changing.
The politics of autonomy
It is then in keeping with this logic that the instrumentally rational pursuit of politics in the narrow sense is often rejected outright in the name of autonomy: Thus movement activity can form part of most of an individual's project of self-development, and it takes its place within the local rationalities of the network on this basis. This logic of autonomy as self-development, however, has immediate effects in relation to the forms of politics which can take root in it, as well as in the attitudes taken to the political.
On the one hand, political forms conducive to this type of autonomy are preferred. Thus the direct democracy of the squat or the occupation and their articulate counterpart in anarchist organising or the network of intersecting projects and its articulate counterpart in green politics represent two possibilities of "doing" politics. Similarly, the immediate, lifeworld-bound activity of demonstrations, direct action, the local project or the once-off event are preferred to more hierarchical political forms, whether of largescale organisation or of clientele-building, whose only possible meaning is instrumental and whose operation runs directly counter to the logic of autonomy:
I think the fact that these people have the laid-back attitude of allowing people to do their own thing is a mechanism which allows very strong personalities and very strong individuals to be able to interact with each other without stomping on each other's toes, and the sorts of ambitions that those people have, and the way in which they allow that ambition to be fulfilled, doesn't involve getting a group of people to centre round you. (Josh)
On the other hand, as we have seen, the political is itself relativised, as one means of pursuing or defending the project of self-development among others. As Melucci has said, activists engage in movement activities on the basis that it has meaning for them, not in terms of its instrumental value: "if it doesn't make sense to me, I am not participating; but what I do also benefits others " (1989: 49) . At the same time, from either a Habermasian or a Foucauldian point of view, this attitude is itself a form of resistance to the instrumental logic of the political system: participants see the defence of personal, psychological and group free space and independence as primary, and participation in more organised "political" ways of realising this goal is always provisional. Thus local rationalities themselves position the political and allocate it a very specific place in terms of the pursuit of autonomous self-development. As we shall see, this is also true in relation to reflexivity.
Lifeworld reflexivity and movement milieux
8 Implementing such a project of autonomous self-development necessarily implies a reflexive attitude to social relations, and more specifically an active reflexivity, in the sense of the creation of meanings and practices which not only defend the "free space" necessary for the project but directly enable this self-development, and develop the projects of the self as they move from the theoretical into the practical.
Movement milieux, then, are reflexive milieux, and we can speak with Lash (1994a) of a lifeworld reflexivity along with self-reflexivity or institutional reflexivity, and attempt to locate movement activities within this logic. In particular, if "self-development" is to have any social reality, it must mean a change of the social relations within which people experience themselves and are confirmed in their identity. This implies a questioning of given social relations and a distancing from them; a search for alternative possibilities;
and an exploration or experimentation with projects, including movement activities, which might enable the realisation of new "identities" or a longerlasting project of self-development. This move away from unreflexive lifeworlds is immediately political, in the sense of raising questions of power and control, but not necessarily in the sense of an engagement with the institutions of political intermediation (Melucci 1992 ).
Distancing from unreflexive lifeworlds
A logical prerequisite for any developed form of reflexivity is a certain measure of distancing from the "normal" and "taken-for-granted" assumptions of unreflexive lifeworlds. At its most basic, this appears as a personal attempt to find another path: As this last comment indicates, these are real choices that have to be made, and continually remade, within individuals' lives ("Why do I make life so hard for myself?"); but they are also made in relation to an alternative habitus ("I just find it immensely boring"). Distancing is not an easy exercise;
and it depends crucially on the availability of local rationalities within which it makes personal and emotional sense. This very often implies a physical distancing towards known movement milieux:
People go [to San Francisco] This suggests something of the working of this conflict between lifeworlds: the pursuit of autonomy leads both to rejection by unreflexive lifeworlds ("too weird", "too freaky") and to rejection of those same lifeworlds ("they can't handle how racist it is"), pushing people towards movement milieux. The reflexive (re-)creation of self starts from deliberate acts of distancing from one's lifeworld background, but for its stabilisation requires an association with the alternative rationalities represented by movement milieux.
The uses of other movement milieux
If this association cannot be face-to-face, mediated participation in other milieux which relativise the here-and-now by making present other cultural possibilities can be an important building block for local reflexive milieux.
These are rarely seen as something to be imitated verbatim; rather, they are used as a tool for opening up a sense of possibility with regard to one's own life -in other words, to enable reflexivity. 
Attitudes to movement projects
Reflexivity, then, involves a certain distancing from customary expectations and a greater awareness of alternative possibilities. If it is taken to its logical conclusion, it naturally involves making some use of these: rather than reproducing existing social relations (albeit with an "ironic" awareness of their contingency), experimenting with alternatives, adopting a reflexive attitude not just in theory but also in practice. I have already mentioned the variety of projects developed within this milieu (see Cox forthcoming for an institutional analysis of such milieux). Some of these projects are relatively successful, for a variety of internal and external reasons; others are stillborn or die rapidly. I am interested here in the cultural habitus, in the sense of a general orientation to the world, that enables this experimentation, that makes it possible to "try out" the implications of reflexivity. The best way of summarising this is seems to be in terms of a general valuation of creativity and "makeability", which as we have seen applies to the self as well as to the external world.
One way in which this habitus appears is in a fascination with form. This is of course a very visible feature of contemporary social movements, where the effort devoted to formulating and implementing an organisational form will often exceed the effort devoted to its ostensible purpose (cf. Melucci 1995) . It also appears, however, in the enjoyment of simply playing with form and ideas, in the elaboration of purely verbal projects, the enjoyment of formalistic "mind games", and the "techie trip" of elegant and baroque technical activity. It can, of course, become the case that form takes over completely from content, or means from ends; this is undoubtedly part of the reason for the inordinate focus on rules and procedures that paradoxically plagues many movement institutions. If I am right, however, this is a necessary price for reflexive rationality.
One corollary of this experimental and playful attitude can be a lack of commitment. The world appears as a series of not entirely binding personal or collective projects and attempts at "getting things together", with a generalised expectation that different people will be "into" different projects at different times. Hence commitment has its costs:
Most people I know don't want to be committed to anything. Or anybody, because they're so desperate to get their lives together, get whatever it is that they want to do together that that takes up an awful lot of time, so they don't want to compromise that by being stuck in one place or one job or with one person or in one country. (Ruth)
In other words, "getting it together" -creative and reflexive activity in general -is potentially threatened by too great a degree of commitment to any specific project. The logical conclusion is that it is normal for participants to 14 see the counter culture as something that is ultimately provisional and external, in other words, to maintain the reflexive attitude to the movement itself. As one participant comments:
It's kind of paradoxical to want to be part of a group and at the same time not yet part of the group. To want to create a comfortable subset or define its boundary or something. (Mark)
The lifeworld, then, is legitimated by its contribution to reflexive projects, and if it moves towards becoming "taken-for-granted" in its turn it needs to be ditched, and for the same reason it was initially entered. Thus it is always an open-ended exercise: too tight an articulation would defeat the purpose.
The fascination with experimentation and the double-edged tolerance and refusal of commitment are ways of structuring interaction within this "free space", the skills of living together in a particular way. This may be formalised at times in particular institutions, but exists primarily as a way of doing things, a common "structure of feeling" geared towards reflexivity.
This has important costs for movement mobilisation. Not only is comitment only likely to projects that have strong personal value, but the lack of commitment to the milieu itself makes stable organisation difficult. Virtually all participants in this network have spent considerable periods of time abroad, for example; the very mobility that facilitates reflexive creativity also makes sustained involvement a difficult achievement. This is exacerbated by the tendency of social relationships to lose their reflexive edge and become "retraditionalised". One participant says of his decision to emigrate: Thus if lifeworld reflexivity and self-reflexivity are blocked by routinisation, "creativity" turns to "stagnation", and the likely response is to move on. But I want to argue that there are also other reasons why "creativity" is likely to generate "stagnation".
The costs of reflexivity
The principle of lifeworld reflexivity implies that all activity, not only work processes or political organisation, requires clear reasons and articulate decisions. Giddens (1994) has recently explored the pathological effects of the impact of reflexivity "from outside" on lifeworld contexts in the generation of compulsive and obsessional activity. What I am researching here, however, is a lifeworld where the demand for reflexivity comes very much "from within".
It is something of a sociological commonplace (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1967 ) that routine, convention, tradition, ritual and so on are enabling mechanisms: they enable the regular production of action without much need for prior thought and discussion, they enable a sedimentation of "howto-do-it" knowledge and skill, and so on. The interest in other ways of life and other ways of thinking about the world, the fascination with form and technique, the interest in talking about impossible projects and so on then acquire another, immediately practical meaning, as ways of discovering problems in play and talk rather than in action and conflict. As one participant puts it: Given the costs of reflexive action, then, it is hardly surprising that life in this milieu alternates between bursts of enthusiastic activity and new projects which do fit the bill of reflexive creativity, and lengthy stretches of "null-space", of talk and play, of understructured inactivity. Thompson (1993) argued that such an alternation of intensive activity and relative inactivity was normal prior to the imposition of industrial labour discipline; its reflexive variant, however, carries with it an alternation between elation and depression that was presumably foreign to the annual agricultural cycle.
The difference between this and the motivational structure of unreflexive contexts is brought out in the following comment:
At the moment he's still officially temporarily employed by [a removals firm], which he has said himself is doing him an absolute world of good in that there is a degree of externally imposed discipline which has a knock-on effect in that he's able to achieve whatever the hell he wants to do, he values his spare time, he uses it efficiently, he gets things done, whereas previously he had so much bloody time to do anything he achieved nothing. (Josh)
For those few activists who overcome the barriers of action on a regular rather than sporadic basis without such external constraints, this is achieved at a very high cost, that of forcing themselves into action, and resolving the difficulties of choice and commitment by placing themselves under extreme moral pressure. The levels of burnout among such activists are then very high, since the amount that needs doing is effectively infinite once reflexivity is applied to one's political persona, and because reflexive modes of organising are not just extremely labour-intensive but also extremely emotional, since they place one's own personal project continually in question and depend on self-exploitation and the mining of this very insecurity.
This can be seen as an additional reason why movement institutions commonly suffer from what Raschke (1993) identifies as a conflict between legitimacy and efficiency. The reflexive attitude is highly legitimate but not particularly efficient. Goal-rational behaviour is illegitimate in terms of both reflexivity and autonomy. Those activists who see the need for goal-rational behaviour commonly suffer, along with the well-known problems faced by all political activists, from a lack of identification with the way in which they need to behave in order to achieve their aims: an acute form of the Weberian paradox. I have suggested that a concept of local rationality can bridge the gap between the sociocultural basis of contemporary movements, their characteristic modes of formation, and their impact on the wider society. The implication is that we could consider individualisation and the development of reflexivity (Giddens 1990 , Beck et al 1994 not as a structural feature of high modernity reflected in contemporary movements, but as a rationality formed within movement milieux. The suggestion that contemporary social movement milieux are a key source of cultural change (Lash and Urry 1987 , Lash 1994a , 1994b , Sulkunen 1992 would then be directly analogous to Weber's arguments about the cultural roots of modernity (1958) . This leaves open the question of how such rationalities are generalised beyond their sources. Before dealing with this, I want to return to the ways in which we interpret social movements.
Local rationalities and movement milieux
Hidden discourses
If social movements, and their milieux, operate under very specific cultural assumptions, researchers who fail to take this explicitly into account will misread much of what they see in terms of their own taken-for-granted assumptions. Despite some honourable exceptions (Diani and Eyerman 1992) , much movement research is unreflexive in this specific sense of failing to thematise -and hence notice -differences in culture. The problem is reinforced if there is a correspondence of the point of view of researchers with that of some participants. The still-dominant academic construction of movements as primarily political, and the corollary of research on the visibly political aspects of movements, is likely to be shared by the most politically active and organised among their movement contacts, and both can collude in this perception of movement as politics. But what if, as we have seen, the committed activist is a rather unusual figure, and The potential tension between the instrumental rationalities of the "system" and the local rationalities of the lifeworld is then also a key element in people's attitude towards political action. If researchers are not alive to this cultural context, they will see only organisation and the difficulties of organisation.
Much of the literature, however, offers an uncritical (because implicit) identification by researchers with movement organisers. There is of course a parallel between their situations: both are intellectuals, in the sense that both are engaged in the theoretical construction of a "movement" as an essentially political entity, and both are involved in the organisation of social relations (of mobilisation, of research) which attempt to involve other participants as part of this political entity.
Yet committed activists (like researchers) are a rather small minority within the networks of those they (occasionally) mobilise, and form only one element, albeit an important one, of movement milieux. A focus on the most active, organised and articulate elements of the lifeworld is in some ways a focus on its least characteristic elements, and on those which are in some important ways least different from the dominant lifeworld: participants who have held formal positions in political organisations, for example, are those who are most likely to have followed conventional career paths in other respects. Not only is the researcher in a similar situation to the activist, but the activist may also be closer to the researcher's lifeworld than many other participants. This is not to argue that only the most inarticulate and disorganised of participants can speak for movements. It is to say that researchers who fail to notice the double hermeneutic, whereby movement cultures are both other than those of the dominant culture and divided between those engaged in their instrumental rationalisation (for political or indeed economic reasons) and those for whom local rationalities prevail, are very likely to systematically misread what is going on in the far more stable milieux from which movement mobilisations occasionally grow. A fully reflexive sociology of the broader movement, by thematising these issues, might make it possible to move beyond this self-confirming situation.
Conclusion: theorising movement milieux
Movement milieux, then, are reflexive lifeworlds where the local rationalities I have described are developed, explored, (partially) institutionalised and from which they may be generalised. This can be phrased in terms of Eyerman and Jamison's definition of a social movement as "a cognitive territory" (1991: 55) , of Wainwright's (1995) analysis of movements as engaging in a grassroots politics of knowledge, or in Gramsci's (1991) concept of intellectual activity as at once "theoretical" and "directive" (organising) activity. The local rationalities of movement milieux then appear as the rethinking and reorganisation of everyday life from below. This naturally comes into constant conflict with the instrumental rationalities of capital and the state, within the lifeworld but also within the individual. This everyday conflict is then a "war of position", in Gramsci's metaphor -a struggle over power relations within the social relations of "civil society" (and the "soft" fringes of the welfare state), rather than the "war of movement"
represented by direct challenges to the coercive core of the state. The construction of hegemony, or the articulation of counter-hegemony, are precisely this practical extension or repulsion of these different rationalities within everyday lives, as agents attempt to structure lifeworld contexts in terms of one or the other. It is in this active way that a formal rationality can be generalised beyond its original lifeworld context, and that social movements can be seen as cultural challenges.
Within contemporary capitalism, groups such as the unemployed and students are "decommodified" (Offe 1985) : they are temporarily or permanently marginalised from the production process and its associated structures of domination. From Berger et al. (1974) to Bey (1995) , this situation has been identified as an important site for the generation of cultural resources for challenges to the dominant forms of late modernity. In particular, autonomy and reflexivity seem "locally rational" responses to this relative weakness of direct domination.
Such lifeworlds, then, are neither simply passive victims of radical modernity nor locations of purely defensive struggles against colonisation by instrumental rationality: their own local rationalities are capable of communicative rationalisation to a point where they can break the bounds 25 of the lifeworld and spread to others. Whether they succeed in doing this is of course a question of the politics of culture.
In western states since 1968, that challenge to previously "taken-forgranted" modes of cultural domination has since been met with responses geared to enabling a resumption of "business as usual". If Touraine (1981) is right in identifying struggles over ñhistoricityî as definitive of social formations, then the shift from ñorganisedî to ñdisorganisedî capitalism is a shift from a "struggle over closure" (between the dominant "old right" and subordinate "old left") to a "struggle over openness", in which the conflict between the dominant forces of disorganised capitalism and the subordinate "new left", or the counter culture, over just how far openness (reflexivity, autonomy) is to be taken, defines the new stakes at issue, and marginalises other forces.
Reflexivity tends to mean a situation where social relations are "consumed" reflexively, but "produced" unreflexively; in other words, a diversity of "negotiated" readings, which represents a precondition for effective cultural hegemony -the ability of the dominated to find their own value in the cultural construction of their own domination (Gramsci 1991: 12 -14) .
Similarly, autonomy tends to mean a situation of atomisation, possessive individualism and goal-rational action. The local rationalities of the counter culture can radicalise both towards an active lifeworld reflexivity which applies to the actual production of social relations as much as to the attitudes adopted towards them, and towards a reflexive autonomy which does not restrict itself to the pursuit of given goals.
The conflict is then precisely over the practical meanings of reflexivity and autonomy: whether they can form part of a new hegemony to contain social conflict, geared around instrumental rationality, or whether they can be radicalised to the point of rupture within the kinds of local rationality I have been describing. McKay (1996) asks why the British state has adopted such 26 a brutal strategy against the free festival scene, the New Traveller lifestyle, rave culture and so on, and notes the paradox that these groups are among the most ñenterprisingî representatives of ñpersonal initiativeî and ñindividual freedomî. Perhaps this paper offers a pointer to the answer.
i I want to thank the participants for the interviews this chapter is based on, and Hilary Tovey and Anna Mazzoldi for comments on earlier versions.
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